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ANNEX 4  
TRAINING

Director's Report to the  
National Security Council

- I. BASIC CONCEPTS
- II. THE TRAINING PROBLEM
- III. ACCOMPLISHMENTS
- IV. CONCLUSIONS


Office of Training  
C.I.A.

4 December 1951

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I. BACKGROUND

1. During the first five years of its existence, the Agency was able to recruit substantial numbers of personnel whose backgrounds included previous intelligence training and experience. Such training and experience had been obtained at staff and operational levels of the Armed Forces, the Department of State, the Joint Staff, the Office of Strategic Services, and the teaching staffs of ranking colleges and universities.

2. The sum total of knowledge in intelligence represented by the Agency's personnel during this period was sufficient, without further formal training, to permit the immediate production of intelligence reports and estimates and the conduct of certain administrative and supporting activities such as organizing the Agency, and exploiting domestic sources of foreign information. It was not sufficient, however, without substantial and continuing effort in training, to mount and conduct espionage and counterespionage operations on a scale commensurate with the established requirements for the national security.

3. Throughout this period, therefore, the major training effort of the Agency continued to be devoted to principles, methods and techniques of espionage and counterespionage; and later, to those of clandestine unconventional warfare activities. It should be noted that the training facilities had already been established during OSS days and were operated under joint functional control of O/SO and O/PC. The only training provided for personnel engaged in non-covert activities was a small amount of language training to meet a few individual job requirements, a certain amount of training on the job, conducted by the individual offices within the Agency on their own initiative, and attendance at National War College lectures.

4. On 20 June 1949, the Congress, in Public Law 110, authorized the Director of Central Intelligence to provide and pay for the training of Agency personnel in governmental and private institutions at home or abroad.

5. The Director, on 2 January 1951, faced with steadily mounting requirements for new personnel and with shortages of those who had previous experience in intelligence, established the Office of Training to formulate and meet the total training requirements of the Agency, both non-covert and covert, utilizing the pre-established facilities for covert training, and to develop a program for the establishment of a

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Career Service in the Central Intelligence Agency. While the concept of centralized training for the Agency was firmly established by this action, it did not alter, in theory or in practice, the basic principle that training and operations are interdependent and mutually supporting.

6. In putting this principle into effect, the Office of Training established a direct and continuous relationship with the operating offices of the Agency. This relationship is maintained through a system of Training Liaison Officers who are appointed for this purpose by each of the Assistant Directors and certain other operating chiefs. Further expression is given to this principle in the organization of the Office of Training, by the establishment of an Assistant Director of Training (General) for non covert training, and by designating the Chief of Covert Training as an Assistant Director of Training (Special). This action ensures effective interchange and helps to resolve common problems.

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II. THE TRAINING PROBLEM

1. Requirements

a. Training requirements exist because many of the skills, methods and techniques peculiar to the intelligence profession are not and should not be taught outside the secure circle of the intelligence community. While intelligence requires personnel from almost every field of the social, physical, natural and military sciences, and from certain technical and administrative fields, additional training is needed to prepare such personnel for the specific tasks of intelligence.

b. Training requirements exist both for new recruits and for old hands; for those who engage in covert activities and non-covert activities; for those who produce national strategic intelligence, who conduct espionage, counterespionage and unconventional warfare operations, or engage in the administrative or supporting activities.

2. Facilities

a. The training facilities involved in meeting its requirements may be organic to the Agency, within the United States or overseas, and they may include those of other governmental or nongovernmental institutions at home or abroad.


b. The potential of United States colleges and universities to provide personnel with more adequate academic backgrounds for intelligence is great but not yet fully developed. In the field of social sciences, particularly, the intelligence profession would be better served by the establishment of more area-study centers covering all fields including the languages, on a "cross-cultural" basis for a particular area. The Russian Institute at Columbia and the Near East Center at Princeton are representative of this intensive study.

c. The universities, on the other hand, cannot establish more adequate facilities as long as the Government continues to make raids on their teaching staffs. This problem has been raised by the colleges and universities themselves through the medium of the Social Science Research Council. Governmental attention has been focused on the problem by the interests of the Bureau of the Budget. It established an ad hoc committee under chairmanship of the Civil Service Commission to find a solution. The Office

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of Training represented the Agency on this committee. It has now recommended the appointment of a permanent committee to give continuing attention to the problem.

d. The Agency participated with the USAF and the Department of State in the 1951 Summer Seminar on the Near East, conducted by the 25X1C



3. Recruits


Most newly recruited personnel are laymen, qualified in one or 25X1C fields in the social, physical, natural or military sciences or in various technical and administrative fields. But they must be assisted to become competent in the field of intelligence. The professional economist, for example, is of optimum use to the intelligence service only when he begins to employ and apply his specialized knowledge primarily as a professional intelligence officer. Similarly, a technician, a supply officer, or a personnel officer, regardless of previously developed excellence in his field, must also become competent in the field of intelligence as it relates to his specific responsibilities in order to provide effective support to Agency activities.

4. Regular Agency Personnel

The impact of training must be brought to bear upon the individual, not only the new recruit but also the old hand at successive stages throughout his intelligence career, with the objective of developing his capacity to be of greater service to the Agency, and of preparing him to accept assignments of increasingly greater responsibility. The training pattern will vary with the individual in each case and will be closely geared with the Agency Career Service Program. In general, the old hand may be detailed for training intermittently with duty assignments to increase the depth of his knowledge on his area, or in a specialized field, to be taught improved techniques of processing information, to be given additional foreign language competence, to be trained in executive management in order that he may better direct and

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supervise the substantive effort of others working in his particular field, and to be given highest level training in the theory of intelligence in support of national policy planning and national decisions. The old hand may be given such additional training to enable him better to perform on his current job, or to permit him to move to another job of greater responsibility. 25X1C



6. Non-Covert Training

a. Prior to World War II, United States strategic intelligence was "departmental" in character, not "national" as it is today. The passage of the National Security Act of 1947 projected the role of strategic intelligence into a higher orbit, and to the highest level at which national policies and national decisions are formulated and put into effect. There has not yet emerged between the producers and consumers, however, a clearly understood and mutually accepted body of doctrine and method for the production of such national strategic intelligence.

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b. The Office of Training proposes to deal with this problem by establishing a National Intelligence Course within the CIA Intelligence School.

(1) The purpose of this course is to provide the highest level of study and analysis on a joint basis of the principles, theory and practice of producing national strategic intelligence in all its forms--from the current intelligence daily summary through and including the national intelligence estimate, and the role of national strategic intelligence in support of policy and strategic planning, and national decisions.

(2) The objectives of this course are to develop and present a sound body of doctrine and method acceptable to the producers and users of national strategic intelligence for the training, not only of CIA personnel but also of selected personnel from those Departments of the Government who participate with CIA in producing national strategic intelligence.

(3) The method of presenting this course includes lectures, seminars and research projects. The pattern of investigation into this field involves an extensive substantive review or post audit, on a "case history" basis, of CIA's intelligence product and its effect in the past upon policy and strategic planning and national decisions. The investigation will include not only the identification of principles which have governed the Agency's production of intelligence in the past, but also the development of those additional principles which should be established to insure optimum intelligence support to the national security. A substantive inquiry such as that described above should be conducted objectively and for the sole purpose of enabling the participants to produce, or to use, national strategic intelligence more effectively for its stated purpose.

(4) The personnel involved in the development and presentation of this course should be selected from within the Agency (O/CI, O/RR and O/NE) and from the NSC Staff, the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, the Joint Staff Planners, and the Plans and Operations Sections of each of the Armed Forces.

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c. The consequences of committing personnel to non covert operations, without adequate basic training, are not physically so dangerous to the individual nor to security of operations as they are in the case of covert operations. The only risk incurred in this case is a reduced efficiency in producing intelligence and a greater drain on the supervisor for a larger scale of effort in training on the job. The present large ratio of unfilled positions in relation to authorized strength of the non covert components of the Agency has made it difficult for the Chiefs concerned to spare new recruits for basic training or release old hands for specialized and advanced training. Accordingly, only those personnel recruited in the "Trainee Pool" of the Office of Training are being given a Basic Intelligence training course. The contribution of training to the effective operation of the Agency will increase as T/O's of the offices become filled.

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III. ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Accomplishments of the Office of Training since its activation on 2 January 1951 are described under the headings listed below. Paragraph 1, Covert Training, represents a continuation of a previously established activity of the Agency. All other items represent new training activities since 2 January 1951. Each item is listed in the order of its relative importance in the opinion of the Office of Training.

25X1C

2. Career Service Program

As part of the basic directive by the Director of Central Intelligence to the Director of Training, a proposed Career Development Program was prepared and completed during the first six months following the establishment of the Office of Training within the Agency. The objective of the proposed program is to create a career intelligence service for CIA. It provides a system of appraisal and assessment of Agency personnel to identify superior employees, rotate them through various tours of duty and training within the Agency and at selected external facilities in order to improve their capacity to serve the Agency. It further provides for a high potential recruitment effort at selected colleges and universities and separation centers of the Armed Forces, aimed toward attracting superior recruits to CIA. A high level committee has been appointed by the Director to consider the proposed program and to make recommendations for putting it into effect.

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3. CIA Intelligence School

The CIA Intelligence School has been established and is presently conducting a basic intelligence course designed to provide qualified laymen with a competence as apprentice intelligence officers. The course consists of twelve weeks of instruction beginning with international relations, the structure of the Government as it relates to intelligence, the principles of strategic intelligence and security. Approximately thirty personnel are processed through this course per quarter. At such time as the T/O's of each of the components of the Agency reflect a higher percentage of on-duty strength, every professional and technical recruit will be required to take the basic intelligence course. It is proposed that additional courses will be added to the School's curricula to cover area familiarization, functional specialization, and intermediate and advanced theory and practice in national strategic intelligence production.

4. The CIA Language School and Language Training

Arrangements have been made with Georgetown University and the Foreign Service Institute of the Department of State to provide various kinds of language training for Agency personnel. Language training to provide reading competence, speaking competence, or both in some eighteen different languages is available under these various programs.

the language training program in addition to their normal work at overseas local universities. In addition to the foregoing, the Agency has set up its own language laboratory to meet training requirements for those personnel who cannot be sent to study at external facilities.

5. Armed Forces Training for Selected CIA Personnel

Agreements have been reached and are now operating with the Air Force, Army, Navy and Marine Corps which will place limited numbers of draft eligible male employees into the Service of the Agency's choice for Basic, OCS, and such specialized training as CIA and the Armed Forces are able to handle. Subsequent to his training within the Service, the individual returns to CIA in an active duty military capacity until he has fulfilled his active duty Service obligation. He then reverts to civilian status as a CIA employee with or without a reserve commission, as the case may be, subject to his qualifying for continued duty with the Agency.

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6. General Training for Provisionally Cleared Personnel

25X9 A general training program was established to give meaningful training to provisionally cleared professional personnel during the period in which final security action is accomplished. The training consists of unclassified presentations of international relations, area knowledge, digest and report writing, reading improvement, specially designed unclassified research projects and language training. It does not approach the basic training offered in the CIA Intelligence School. Approximately [REDACTED] are processed through this course every six weeks. This program greatly assists the holding of people post recruitment while security clearance procedure is going on.

7. Clerical Training

A clerical refresher course has been established to improve skills in typing, shorthand, accounting, filing, English usage, stenotyping, and office practices. This course is geared to handle approximately forty personnel per month.

8. Orientation

An orientation course has been established and is held quarterly for all new personnel who have reported to duty during the quarter and for those older employees who have not attended any of the previous orientation courses. The objective of the orientation courses is to explain the role of strategic intelligence in terms of the Agency's mission. This course is conducted over a period of four half days. The principal speakers include the Director of Central Intelligence, his Deputies, selected Assistant Directors, Agency specialists, and one or more prominent Government officials outside the Agency. Approximately four hundred personnel attend each session.

9. Indoctrination

An indoctrination system has been established as part of the entrance on duty procedure for all incoming employees and consists of a three hour presentation of the mission and objectives of the Agency together with a discussion of its organization and relationship to the other Governmental agencies.

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10. Testing and Assessment

25X9 a. A system of individual testing and assessment has been established to process all professional personnel who participate in the training programs listed above in order to ensure proper selection of the individual's assignment and adequate direction of the individual's talents, both actual and potential. Approximately [REDACTED] personnel are tested and assessed for these purposes per quarter. 25X1A

25X1A b. The Agency has retained the services of the [REDACTED] to study Agency job families and recommend criteria and standards for pre and post recruitment testing of personnel. This study has just been completed and is being analyzed for application to Agency problems.

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IV. CONCLUSIONS

1. Since 2 January 1951, a start has been made in developing a program to provide non covert training for the Agency as a new activity.
2. All training of the Agency has been placed under centralized policy control and is being considered as an element of a Career Service Program for the Agency.
3. During the coming year, the Agency training effort will be directed toward:
  - a. perfecting the training segment of the Career Service Program.
  - b. putting into effect intermediate and advanced training programs presently planned and improving those programs already operating.
  - c. surveying existing Governmental and non governmental training facilities external to the Agency in order to devise effective utilization of these for Agency purposes.